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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a 
jury trial in the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, presiding. The case 
involved charges of violating Section 105 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City prohibiting driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. Authority for this appeal is provided 
in Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court's Instruction No. 16 correctly 
state the law regarding "physical control" of an automobile 
necessary for conviction of driving under the influence 
under Section 105 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence presented to the jury 
to show that defendant/appellant Dennis ("Dennis") was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle? 
3. Was the trial court's sentencing of defendant 
Dennis under Section 105 proper after the jury had convicted 
Dennis of violating Section 105? 
4. Was the trial Court's admission of the intoxilyzer 
proper? 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES 
Section 105, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
(1984) 
Users of drugs and intoxicants. It is 
unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or greater by weight, or who 
is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of 
a vehicle within this city. The fact that a 
person charged with violating this section is 
or has been legally entitled to use alcohol 
or a drug does not constitute a defense 
against any charge of violating this section 
Section 108, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
(1965). 
Intoxicated person in or about vehicle. It 
shall be unlawful for any person under the 
influence of alcohol or any drugs to be in or 
about any vehicle with the intention of 
driving or operating such vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a a criminal conviction and 
sentencing for the violation of Section 105 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City for driving or being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. After a trial in the Fifth Circuit Court, the 
Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve presiding, a jury found 
Dennis guilty of Section 105. A motion for new trial was 
made and denied and Dennis was sentenced for violating 
Section 105. The facts, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict are as follows: 
-2-
FACTS 
1. Dennis testified that on February 23, 1986 after 
completing a day of skiing at Park City, he had "several 
glasses of scotch "prior to eating some pizza for dinner at 
approximately 9:00. (R. 171.) Dennis weighs 170 pounds (R. 
277) and had no lunch on the day in question. (R. 276.) 
Along with the pizza, and after the scotch, Dennis also 
drank wine prior to getting in his car to head for Salt Lake 
City. (R. 278.) Dennis admitted that while driving home he 
became lost on Foothill Drive and "at that time, I felt very 
tired and I felt the effects of alcohol coming on, I decided 
just to go to sleep." (R. 268-269.) 
2. Dennis left his driving lights on and left his 
vehicle running while he was sleeping. (R. 275.) All that 
would have been required for Dennis to drive the van was for 
him to wake up from his drunken nap, take the emergency 
brake off and put the automatic transmission in drive. (R. 
282. ) 
3. Salt Lake City Police Officer D. W. Holmes was 
called to the scene of 1240 South Foothill Drive after a 
report over the radio of a vehicle at that location. (R. 
159, 169.) Officer Holmes arrived to find Dennis's van 
parked in a traveled roadway portion of Foothill Drive. (R. 
175.) Holmes observed Dennis seated behind the steering 
wheel of the van with the engine running. (R. 160. ) After 
receiving no response to his attempts to obtain Dennisf s 
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attention from outside the vehicle Holmes opened the 
driver's door and turned off the ignition key whereupon 
Dennis woke up. (R. 160-161.) Holmes questioned Dennis and 
noted his confusion and slurred deliberate speech as well as 
an odor of alcohol within the vehicle. (R. 161- 162.) 
4. After Dennis got out of the van almost falling to 
the ground Officer Holmes also noticed a very strong odor of 
alcoholic beverage on Dennis himself and began to suspect 
that Dennis might be intoxicated. (R. 162-163.) Officer 
Holmes then had Dennis perform four field sobriety tests 
which were all failed miserably. (R. 163-167.) At that 
point Officer Holmes placed Dennis under arrest for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. (R. 167.) 
5. Officer Holmes then transferred Dennis to another 
Salt Lake City Police Officer, Jewkes, who had been called 
to the scene to transport Dennis to jail. Officer Jewkes 
properly performed an intoxilizer test on Dennis which 
showed that Dennis's blood alcohol content was .22, almost 
three times the legal presumption level. (Exhibits 1 and 2, 
R. 250.) 
6. During the course of the trial discussions took 
place between the trial court and counsel on at least three 
separate occasions concerning Dennis's counsel's request for 
an instruction on the "lesser included offense" of being 
intoxicated in or about a vehicle under Section 108 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. (R. 113-119, 228-249, 
-4-
and R. 283-295.) The trial court ruled that, if the facts 
supported the possibility that a jury could find Dennis 
guilty of Section 108, but not Section 105, then Dennis was 
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction pursuant 
to State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 151 (Utah 1983). (R. 284.) 
7. There was also discussion between the trial court 
and counsel to the effect that, if Dennis were convicted of 
both Section 108 and Section 105, he would have to be 
sentenced under the lesser of the two statutory penalties. 
(R. 245.) To avoid the possibility of conflicting 
convictions the trial judge gave Instruction No. 19. (R. 67 
& 304.) 
8. The trial court also gave an instruction defining 
"actual physical control" as used in Section 105. The trial 
court's Instruction No. 16 read: 
You are instructed that to be in "actual 
physical control" of a motor vehicle the 
defendant need not be exercising conscious 
volition with regard to the vehicle and the 
vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the 
defendant, of his own choice, placed himself 
behind the wheel, either started the motor or 
allowed it to run. (R. 64 and 303.) 
9. Contrary to the representation in Dennis's Brief, 
at page 11, the City Prosecutor did not say that Instruction 
There is absolutely no support in the record for Dennis's 
unreferenced quotation at page 3 of his brief that "prior to 
that both counsel had been convinced that Judge McCleve 
would only impose the sentence for violating Section 108 if 
the defendant was convicted." 
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16 had "come directly from Garcia v. Schwendiman [645 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1982)]." Instead, the Prosecutor said that the 
instruction was "taken from a charge that was prepared based 
on the Garcia case . . . ." (R. 232, 213-214.) Defense 
counsel raised no exception to Instruction No. 16. (R. 293-
294.) Only after the charge to the jury did defense counsel 
object to Instruction 16 claiming that it did not properly 
represent the Supreme Court's "actual physical control" 
standards established in Garcia. (R. 318-322.) This was 
despite the fact that the City Prosecutor gave defense 
counsel a copy of the Garcia opinion early in the morning. 
The trial court polled the jury to find out whether they had 
placed any specific emphasis on Instruction No. 16 and all 
four jurors replied in the negative. (R. 323-325.) 
Dennis was sentenced for his conviction under Section 
105 and a motion for new trial was denied. (R. 89.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Instruction 16 correctly stated the law in Utah 
concerning "actual physical control." The Supreme Court has 
clearly and consistently ruled that "actual physical 
control" of an automobile is distinguished from "driving" 
and does not require either actual intent nor conscious 
volition. "Actual physical control" simply means that an 
intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a car 
with the actual ability to drive is a threat to the safety 
of the public. Garcia, supra. 
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Dennis was clearly in actual physical control of his 
van while seated at the steering wheel in the traveled 
portion of the highway with the motor running and the lights 
on. His sole defense was: "I'm sorry Officer I was so 
drunk that I fell asleep"; this excuse is absurd and if 
accepted as a valid defense would completely vitiate the DUI 
statutes of both Salt Lake City and the State of Utah. 
The trial court's giving of a lesser included offense 
instruction, at the request of Dennis, was appropriate under 
the facts and in no way prejudiced Dennis. The trial 
court's sentencing under Section 105 for a conviction under 
Section 105 was entirely appropriate because Section 105 and 
Section 108 are separable statutes having different elements 
and which are applicable under different circumstances. 
Finally, the trial court's admission of the intoxilyzer 
results, without proper objection, was appropriate under the 
facts and case law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW OF UTAH 
REGARDING "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" OF 
AN AUTOMOBILE NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION 
UNDER SECTION 105. 
The recent case law on "actual physical control" is all 
derived from the implied consent statute cases under Section 
41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The language of that 
statute is identical to both the State DUI statute, Section 
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41-6-44(1), and Section 105, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Interpretation of this language by the Utah Supreme 
Court is found in three cases: State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971); Garcia v. Schwendiman, supra; and, 
Lopez v, Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986). 
In Bugger the defendant's automobile was completely off 
the traveled portion of the highway and the motor was not 
running. The defendant was asleep in the automobile but it 
is not clear from the opinion whether the defendant was in 
2 
the back seat or the front seat. Under the facts of the 
case the Court found that the defendant was not controlling 
the vehicle. The Bugger Court, however, expressly noted 
that the ruling would likely be different where, as in the 
instant case, the motor was running or the driver was in the 
driver's seat; it observed: 
It is noted that the cases cited by the 
[state] in support of its position in this 
matter deal with entirely different fact 
situations, such as where the driver was 
seated in his vehicle on the traveled portion 
of the highway; or where the motor of the 
vehicle was operating . . . . Bugger, supra 
483 P.2d at 443. 
Of course, in this case Dennis was seated behind his 
steering wheel in the vehicle on the traveled portion of the 
highway, with the motor running. 
2 
The dissent refers to the vehicle as a truck from which 
one could possibly deduce, though it is not in the record, 
that the defendant was in the front, or only, seat sleeping. 
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The narrow issue in Bugger was later substantially 
clarified in Garcia. In Garcia the defendant's vehicle was 
blocked from moving backwards by a concerned citizenfs car 
and was faced in front by a fence. A police officer 
reporting to the scene observed Garcia attempting to start 
his car with the keys in the ignition. The Supreme Court 
extensively reviewed the law from other jurisdictions across 
the country to determine what constituted "actual physical 
control." 
The Court noted that Bugger was simply a factual 
decision and did not apply a general rule. Garcia, supra, 
at 653. The Court held that: 
Acts short of starting the motor have been 
held to constitute actual physical control in 
other jurisdiction. Garcia, supra at 653. 
The Court cited, with approval, an Oklahoma case holding: 
We believe that an intoxicated person seated 
behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle 
is a threat to the safety and welfare of the 
public. . . . The defendant when arrested 
may have been exercising no conscious 
volition with regard to the vehicle, still 
there is a legitimate inference to be drawn 
that he placed himself behind the wheel of a 
vehicle and could have at any time started 
the automobile and driven away. Garcia, 
supra, at 653 citing Hughes v. State, Okl. 
Cr., 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1975). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Of course, in the instant case the vehicle was already 
started and running. 
The Court also cited with approval another case whose 
facts are even closer to the instant case. In City of 
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Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio 1976), an 
intoxicated motorist seated in the driver's seat of a 
legally parked car with his hands on the steering wheel and 
the keys in the ignition was found to be in actual physical 
control of his vehicle, even though the engine was off. To 
reiterate, to the point of redundancy, Dennis's vehicle was 
running and he was in the travelled portion of the street. 
The Court in Garcia also cited the case of State v. 
Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981), where defendant who 
had been found inside a pickup truck seated behind and 
leaning against a steering wheel was held to be in "actual 
physical control" of the vehicles. The Garcia Court noted, 
Garcia, supra at 654,: 
While there was uncertainty as to whether the 
motor was running, the court held that 
"[w]hether a motor must be running before a 
person may be in actual physical control is 
essentially a policy issue." 308 N.W.2d at 
320. 
After this exhaustive review of national case law the 
Court stated its holding in Garcia as follows: 
As a matter of public policy and statutory 
construction, we believe that the "actual 
physical control" language of Utah's implied 
consent statute should be read as intending 
to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering 
their vehicles except as passengers or 
passive occupants as in Bugger, supra. 
Therefore, under the facts before us, where a 
motorist occupied the driver's position 
behind the steering wheel, with possession of 
Garcia, supra at 654. 
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the ignition key and with the apparent 
ability to start and move the vehicle,, we 
hold that there has been an adequate showing 
of "actual physical control" under our 
implied consent statute• Garcia, supra at 
654. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) 
Footnote 3 to the quotation cited above notes that 
Garcia was having difficulty starting his car because of his 
degree of intoxication. The Court observed that: 
[N]othing in the record warrants a finding 
that the plaintiff was physically unable to 
start the car, as would be the case with an 
unconscious or sleeping motorist. Garcia, 
supra at 654, fn. 3. 
In the instant case Dennis's van was already started. 
All that was required for Dennis to do to move the car was 
to wake up in his drunken stupor, take off the emergency 
brake and engage the automatic transmission. 
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, supra, the intoxicated 
defendant was found asleep in the driver's seat with his 
head resting on the wheel. The truck's motor was not 
running, but there were tracks of the pickup in the freshly 
fallen snow. As a defense, Lopez contended that the truck's 
battery was dead and that he was merely waiting for his wife 
to come tow the truck home. The Court noted that the 
"inoperability" defense did not protect the defendant. The 
Court held: 
Utah's statute provides for the arrest of one 
"in actual physical control" of the vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol and/or 
drugs. That requirement was intended by our 
legislature to protect public safety and 
apprehend the drunken driver before he or she 
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strikes, . . . and may not be construed to 
exclude those whose vehicles are presently 
immobile because of mechanical trouble. 
Lopez, supra at 781. 
Again, in the instant case there was no mechanical trouble 
with the vehicle which was running when the police arrived. 
This extensive review of the law establishes 
conclusively that the Court's Instruction No. 16 was 
appropriate given the facts of this case. As the Court 
noted in Garcia, supra at 655: 
Similarly, we find it unnecessary for the 
[state] to show actual intent under the 
control provisions of the implied consent 
statute. Just as an intent to drive is 
inferred from one's actual driving, so also 
may an intent to control a vehicle be 
inferred from the performance of those acts 
which we have held to constitute actual 
physical control. 
In Lopez and Garcia the Court held, in much the same 
language as Instruction 16, that a defendant who places 
himself behind the wheel of a car while intoxicated was 
guilty of "actually physically controlling" a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol. Instruction 16 was a 
correct statement of the law and should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS MORE THAN 
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT WAS IN 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF HIS VEHICLE. 
The facts which were brought out at trial are 
extensively stated in the Statement of the Case above, pp. 
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3-6, and will not be reiterated in detail here. Simply put, 
Dennis admitted, and the police testified, that Dennis was 
stone drunk and asleep behind the wheel of an automobile 
whose engine was running and which was in the traveled 
portion of the roadway. There is simply no significant 
dispute about these facts and they are more than sufficient 
to meet any burden of proof possibly required. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCING OF THE 
DEFENDANT UNDER SECTION 105 FOR HIS 
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 105 WAS PROPER. 
Over the strong objections of the City Prosecutor, the 
Court gave three instructions requested by Dennis concerning 
the lesser included offense of being drunk in or about a 
vehicle under Section 108, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City. (R. 303-304). The trial court apparently concluded 
that the facts presented by the defendant's testimony may 
have convinced a jury that Dennis was only guilty of being 
"drunk in or about" the vehicle, rather than being in 
"actual physical control" of the vehicle. Given this belief 
the Court properly read State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983) to require giving an instruction on a lesser included 
offense, even though Section 108 was not a "necessarily 
included" offense. These instructions were, since they had 
been requested by Dennis, obviously not objected to by 
Dennis. 
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The facts in this case are so compelling for conviction 
that a directed verdict would have been appropriate, if such 
an option were available in criminal cases. Thus, even 
having the benefit of this lesser included instructions the 
jury found Dennis guilty of Section 105 for being in "actual 
physical control" of his vehicle. Dennis was then 
appropriately sentenced for violating Section 105. 
Dennis now claims that Section 105 and Section 108 are 
identical and therefore subject to the generally accepted 
rule that: 
Where there are two statutes which prescribe 
the same conduct but impose different 
penalties, the violator is entitled to the 
lesser. Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 
1109 (Utah 1977). (Footnote omitted.) 
There is a significance weakness in Dennis's argument 
which the Court set out in the very next sentence in 
Rammell, supra at 1109: 
The difficulty with petitioner's argument is 
that the two statutes referred to do not 
prohibit exactly the same conduct. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Similar to that caveat, Section 105 and Section 108 in the 
instant case do not prohibit the same conduct. 
One can quite easily envision circumstances where a 
conviction under Section 108 would be appropriate, but a 
conviction under Section 105 might prove impossible. For 
example, an intoxicated individual could get in the wrong 
car and thus be incapable of controlling the vehicle. 
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Similarly, an intoxicated defendant could pick up the wrong 
keys for his own car and thus be unable to control the 
vehicle. Section 108 only requires "intent[] to . . . 
operat[e]" whereas Section 105 requires "actual physical 
control. " Since the two statutes, Section 105 and Section 
108, do not proscribe the same conduct they do not entitle 
Dennis to the lesser sentencing. 
The other cases cited by Dennis in his brief are 
similarly unavailing. State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d (Utah 
1978) simply quotes and reiterates Rammell. State v. Fair, 
23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969), and State v. Shondel, 22 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), merely restate the general 
rule concerning identical offenses. State v. Kish, 28 Utah 
2d 430, 503 P.2d 1208 (1972), is absolutely and totally 
irrelevant. Kish deals with a co-defendant accepting a plea 
bargain while another defendant chose to go to trial. It 
has no bearing on the question of lesser included offenses. 
Dennis also makes an argument to the effect that the 
Judge, by agreeing to allow a lesser included offense 
instruction somehow is bound to sentence on the lesser 
included offense even if the conviction was for the greater 
-15-
offense. This illogical argument is not supported by any 
relevant cases. The two cases cited by Dennis allegedly 
supporting this proposition are totally off point. In both 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 
S.Ct. 495 (1971) and State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) 
the issue involved whether the trial court's acceptance of a 
plea bargain, with sentencing restrictions, was appropriate. 
In Santobello a change of counsel for the prosecution 
resulted in the prosecutor violating a plea bargain 
agreement for a "no recommendation" on the sentence. The 
Court held that such a violation of a plea bargain agreement 
required remand. In Kay the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether the trial court could refuse to adhere to the terms 
of a plea bargain which allowed the defendant to plea guilty 
to three counts of capital homicide in exchange for a life 
imprisonment sentence, without the possibility of death. 
The Court found that numerous errors by the trial court and 
Dennis's brief intimates that he was somehow "sandbagged" 
into taking the stand and "confessing" due to confusion on 
his counsel's part concerning sentencing in the event that 
he was convicted under both Section 105 and Section 108. 
(See, e.g. Brief of Appellant pp. 8-10 and 13-17.) The 
primary weakness in this argument is that it is totally 
unsupported by the record. There is no evidence in the 
record that Dennis's decision to take the stand was anything 
other than a tactical move in an attempt to convince the 
jury to find him guilty of Section 108, rather than Section 
105. Dennis cites no case law, and there obviously is none, 
supporting his porposition that this Court should relieve 
him of his tactical error at trial. 
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the defendant's counsel allowed the invalidation of the plea 
bargain agreement. 
The trial court in the instant case was instead faced 
with a defense request for instructions on a lesser included 
offense. There was no guarantee that the Court would 
sentence under Section 108 instead of Section 105. In fact, 
what the Court stated was that if Dennis was convicted on 
both Section 105 and Section 108 he could only be sentenced 
under the lesser offense. The relevant portion of the 
transcript reads as follows: 
MR. KEESLER: I'd like to make sure I follow 
the analogy that Counsel is saying. Counsel 
is saying that in every event if a person is 
guilty of a major offense and a lesser-
included offense,, he can only be found guilty 
of the lesser-included offense? 
MR. McINTYRE: Or he must be sentenced 
under--
THE COURT: He must be sentenced under the 
lesser-included offense, and that's a rule 
that Justice Durham wrote in Baker, and—and 
the Court followed. 
Well, that's--you know--
(Inaudible) 
MR. KEESLER: Everyone who commits murder can 
also commit manslaughter. So you're saying 
that every murder case then must be sentenced 
as a manslaughter. 
MR. McINTYRE: No, no, if— 
THE COURT: No, if the facts— 
MR. McINTYRE: If—it must be submitted under 
manslaughter, and then if he's convicted of 
it, he has to--
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THE COURT: And to not give a lesser-included 
offense instruction is reversible error. But 
let me take a look at Baker, and I--
MR. KEESLER: Well, if I understood Counsel, 
he's saying that the defendant could be 
convicted of both, but can only be found 
guilty of the lesser-included offense. 
MR. McINTYRE: No. If he's convicted of 
both, he can only be sentenced--
THE COURT: If he can be convicted of both, 
you have to sentence under the lesser, under 
this case. (Emphasis added.) (R. 244-245.) 
Of course, the trial court properly avoided the 
possibility of conviction on both statutes by giving an 
"either or" instruction allowing conviction on only one 
violation. (R. 67, 197, 285 and 304.) That is exactly what 
the jury did. 
POINT IV 
ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS WAS 
PROPER AND WAS NOT PROPERLY OBJECTED TO. 
One searches Argument IV of Dennis's Brief in vain for 
any reference to a proper objection to the admission of the 
intoxilyzer results. In fact, the only objection raised at 
trial to the intoxilyzer results dealt with whether the 
administering officer's operating certificate for the 
intoxilyzer was properly dated. (R. 215-223, 225, 226-227.) 
The transcript of the proceedings concerning the admission 
of the intoxilyzer results reads as follows: 
MR. KEESLER: . . . We would at this time, 
your honor, offer the City's exhibits No. 1 
and 2, the operational checklist and the 
intoxilyzer test record into evidence. 
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MR. McINTYRE: Objection, your honor. 
THE COURT: . . . okay. Let me hear your 
grounds for the objection, again, and any 
response. 
MR. McINTYRE: Your honor, this Officer has 
testified that he doesn't -- that his 
certification is not a valid certification. 
(R. 225-226.) 
This appeal is not a Sixth Amendment denial of 
effective representation of counsel case. Dennis can hardly 
be claiming that his law partner, who represented him at 
trial, and on this appeal, was incompetent at trial. Rule 
103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits . . . evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, 
and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific grounds of the objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; . . . (Emphasis added). 
The argument which Dennis raises in his brief 
concerning the intoxilyzer admission was never presented to 
the trial court. It is thus obviously not proper to raise 
this objection for the first time on appeal. Barson by and 
through Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984). 
Even had the objection been properly raised at the 
trial court it could not have been sustained. The law 
concerning "actual physical control" of a vehicle necessary 
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to convict under Section 105 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City was all drawn from the "implied consent 
statute" of Section 41-6-44.10 (Utah Code Ann,). The cases 
and law are cited in Point I, supra and make it undeniably 
clear that Dennis was in "actual physical control" of his 
van which was parked in the traveled portion of the highway, 
with the lights on and the motor running. As the Court 
noted in Lopez, supra at 781: 
The trial court here found that there were 
tire tracks leading up to the vehicle, that 
the vehicle had to have reached its point of 
rest "apparently on its own power," and that 
Lopez had failed the field sobriety tests. 
The law and reasoning of Lopez and Garcia are applicable to 
the instant case, mutatis mutandis. 
An obvious drunk who staggers out of his vehicle which 
is left running in the road with the lights on and fails all 
the field sobriety tests,provides more than ample probable 
cause to an Officer for the admission of an intoxilyzer. In 
any event, having failed to timely object to its admission, 
Dennis cannot now complain. 
CONCLUSION 
Instruction 16 correctly stated the law of Utah 
concerning "actual physical control" which does not require 
conscious volition, a functioning automobile, or driving. 
To meet the actual physical control element, a defendant 
simply must place himself behind the steering wheel of a car 
with the ignition key. 
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In this case, Dennis was drunk, seated behind the 
steering wheel of a car that was running with its lights on 
and in a traveled portion of the highway. The jury 
correctly found Dennis guilty based on overwhelming evidence 
of a violation of Section 105, even though he had the 
benefit of a lesser included offense instruction at his 
request. Thus, the Court's sentencing under Section 105 was 
entirely appropriate. 
The trial court's admission of the intoxilyzer result 
was appropriate because there was more than ample proximate 
cause for the Officer to administer the test and, more 
importantly, defense counsel never properly objected to its 
admission. This conviction and sentence are entirely 
correct and should be sustained on appeal. 
BRUCE R. BAIRD' 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BRB:cc 
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